Privacy for Rescue: A New Testimony Why Privacy is Vulnerable In Deep
  Models by Gao, Ruiyuan et al.
Privacy for Rescue: A New Testimony Why Privacy is Vulnerable In Deep Models
Ruiyuan Gao , Ming Dun , Hailong Yang , Zhongzhi Luan , Depei Qian
Beihang University
{gaoruiyuan, dunming0301, hailong.yang, 07680, depeiq}@buaa.edu.cn
Abstract
The huge computation demand of deep learning
models and limited computation resources on the
edge devices calls for the cooperation between edge
device and cloud service by splitting the deep mod-
els into two halves. However, transferring the in-
termediate results from the partial models between
edge device and cloud service makes the user pri-
vacy vulnerable since the attacker can intercept the
intermediate results and extract privacy information
from them. Existing research works rely on metrics
that are either impractical or insufficient to mea-
sure the effectiveness of privacy protection meth-
ods in the above scenario, especially from the as-
pect of a single user. In this paper, we first present
a formal definition of the privacy protection prob-
lem in the edge-cloud system running DNN mod-
els. Then, we analyze the-state-of-the-art methods
and point out the drawbacks of their methods, es-
pecially the evaluation metrics such as the Mutual
Information (MI). In addition, we perform several
experiments to demonstrate that although existing
methods perform well under MI, they are not effec-
tive enough to protect the privacy of a single user.
To address the drawbacks of the evaluation metrics,
we propose two new metrics that are more accu-
rate to measure the effectiveness of privacy protec-
tion methods. Finally, we highlight several poten-
tial research directions to encourage future efforts
addressing the privacy protection problem.
1 Introduction
Despite the powerful generalization capability of Deep
Neural Networks (DNNs), their computation demands are
tremendous. Especially in the field of edge computing, the
edge devices are commonly utilized by deep learning appli-
cations in combination with online services (or cloud), due
to the limited computing ability. In such case, users need
to provide the data (e.g., images) generated at the edge de-
vices (e.g., camera) to the service providers in order to get
their responses (e.g., objects in an image). Although the col-
laboration between cloud services and edge devices boosts
the development of deep learning applications in innovative
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Figure 1: An illustrative example for collaboration between edge de-
vice and cloud service. In this case, the user may suffer from privacy
breach if the intermediate results are intercepted and combined with
another deep model by the malicious provider.
ways, protecting user’s privacy in such scenario becomes a
major concern, which could lead to severe privacy breach if
not paying enough attention.
On one hand, sending user’s raw data from edge device to
cloud is the most risky way, because the data can be inter-
cepted during various stages, such as software stack [Risten-
part et al., 2009], and network communication [Zhou et al.,
2018]. On the other hand, if all DNN computation is per-
formed on edge device, there is no need to worry about pri-
vacy breach. However, in practice this is infeasible because
the computation demands of deep models are prohibitive for
edge devices. Although traditional cryptographic techniques
such as multiparty execution [Bahmani et al., 2017] and ho-
momorphic encryption [Liu et al., 2017] are applied to DNNs
for protecting privacy, the encryption and decryption opera-
tions themselves require too much computation, which is not
affordable for edge devices.
In practice, a compromise is reached between the load on
edge device and privacy preservation [Osia et al., 2018]. A
commonly adopted approach is to cut a deep model into two
parts and run each part on the edge device and cloud service
respectively, as shown in Fig 1. The partial model running
on the edge device (edge model) contains the first m layers,
which takes user raw data as input and generates an interme-
diate result as output. The other partial model running on the
cloud service (cloud model) contains the rest n − m layers,
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
00
49
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
1 D
ec
 20
19
which takes intermediate result from the edge model as in-
put and generates the final result. To protect the privacy of
the intermediate result, techniques such as applying noise to
the intermediate [Mireshghallah et al., 2019] are proposed,
which reduces the Shanon’s Mutual Information (MI).
However, the research on privacy protection regarding the
scenario of synergy between edge and cloud running DNN
application is still preliminary and requires more research ef-
forts. In this paper, we consider privacy attack as shown
in Fig. 1, which could come from both network hacker and
malicious service provider. Even though attackers cannot
recover the raw user data, they can reveal private informa-
tion from the intermediate results [Pan and Yang, 2010],
which is far beyond the task that user intends to do. Ex-
isting approaches [Osia et al., 2018; Mireshghallah et al.,
2019] prevent privacy breach by cutting deep models at ap-
propriate layers between edge and cloud, and then applying
noise or adjusting feature extraction to the intermediate re-
sults. However, existing metrics (e.g., MI) are not good indi-
cators for measuring the effectiveness of privacy protection,
especially from a single user aspect. For example, Shred-
der [Mireshghallah et al., 2019] uses MI to represent the in-
formation loss at the scope of entire database rather than pair-
wise images. Therefore, the value of MI cannot be used to
measure the amount of private breach for a single user.
To clearly articulate the scenario and the risk of privacy
breach, we take Fig 1 for an example. A user takes a photo
and wants to identify the breed of the cow. However, the
photo also accidentally contains a person, which is irrelevant
to the user’s task. Normally, the service provider only per-
forms the designed task and returns the answer to the user.
However, a malicious provider may take the intermediate re-
sults sent from the user device and feed them to another pre-
trained cloud model that is used to identify gender, age, and
other private information of the person in the user image.
The above privacy breach still happens even if the interme-
diate results are applied with noise and thus exhibit lower
MI [Mireshghallah et al., 2019], which we will demonstrate
in the following experiments.
This paper provides a new testimony that the privacy of
current edge-cloud system running deep models is vulnera-
ble. We advocate for more research attention in such area
to promote the advance of privacy protection that is far from
satisfactory. Specifically, we articulate the edge-cloud sce-
nario running deep neural models where the privacy breach
could happen. In addition, we formulate the privacy protec-
tion problem and propose a new metric to measure the effec-
tiveness of privacy protection. Moreover, we perform a serial
of experiments to demonstrate that none of the existing ap-
proaches can protect the privacy perfectly in such scenario.
We hope these experiment results can layout a solid founda-
tion for further research efforts. Finally, we discuss the po-
tential key points that need to be addressed in future studies
in order to protect privacy for deep neural models running on
the edge-cloud system.
2 Related Work
Privacy has always been a major problem for IT service
providers [Shokri and Shmatikov, 2015]. Ever since the re-
alization of applying DNN models in various application do-
mains, researchers have been thinking about how to provide
privacy protection for DNN models.
Recently, many research work focuses on preserving pri-
vacy for the training procedure of DNN. By applying a
privacy-preserving strategy with federated learning, [Segal et
al., 2017] is able to provide increasing privacy protection for
the training data provider. Differential Privacy (DP) [Cor-
mode et al., 2018] is also a competitive theory for privacy
protection. Benefit from its theoretical foundation, local DP
has been broadly used when training a new model [Cormode
et al., 2018]. However, the main objective of above strategies
is privacy protection for the training data provider, and their
applicability at inference stage to protect privacy for a single
user remains questionable.
Encryption and cryptographic techniques are naturally
considered to protect privacy in the scenario of edge-cloud
system running deep neural models. Secure Multiparty Com-
putation (SMC) [Bahmani et al., 2017] provides a paradigm
to keep security using cloud computing at the absence of a
trustworthy service provider. [Liu et al., 2017] and [Dowlin
et al., 2016] expand the traditional encryption techniques to
implement SMC. They allow cloud computing based on en-
crypted data. As a result, all data sent by edge device is en-
crypted, and thus safe for computation and communication.
However, the above methods require a large amount of com-
putation for encryption and decryption operations, especially
when the DNN models are used to process a large volume
of data. Therefore, such intrinsic drawback prevents their
widely adoption in practice.
Shredder [Mireshghallah et al., 2019] and DPFE [Osia et
al., 2018] are the most recent research works that are de-
signed for the scenario of edge-cloud system and focus on
protecting the user privacy during inference. DPFE based on
the assumption that the end user knows what kind of infor-
mation they would like to protect. However, in practice, not
all end users know what information they should pay special
attention to. Even worse, some users are unaware of privacy
breach at all. As for Shredder, the metric MI used for evalu-
ating the effectiveness of privacy protection cannot truthfully
reflect the privacy preservation for a single user. In addition,
they assume that the attacker will not re-train the cloud model
after acquiring the intermediate results, which can easily in-
validate their approach of applying noise to the intermediate
results for privacy protection.
3 Understanding Privacy Breach
To understand the privacy breach, we need to clearly define
the scenario for privacy protection and how to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of a given method. In the section, we first present
the formulated description about the scenario where the edge
device cooperates with service provider running DNN mod-
els to serve user’s request, and define the privacy that needs
to be protected (Sec. 3.1). After that, we point out the major
drawbacks in the hypothesis or evaluation settings that makes
existing approaches ineffective to protect privacy (Sec. 3.2) in
our scenario. Finally, we propose our testimony for a new set
of metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of privacy protection
methods for a single user (Sec. 3.3).
3.1 Privacy for End User
To deploy a pre-trained deep model model = f(x; θ), where
x is input and θ is parameter, in edge-cloud system, common
practice is to cut it into two parts. modell = fl(x; θl) stands
for the first several layers of the model that are computed on
edge device, whereas modelr = fr(x; θr) stands for the rest
layers that are computed on cloud service. Thus, we can de-
scribe the above deployment using Eq. 1 and Eq. 2, where a
is the intermediate result that needs to be sent to the cloud
service, and y is the final result.
y = f(x; θ) = fr(a; θr) (1)
a = fl(x; θl) (2)
As illustrated in Fig. 1, in this paper, we consider the pri-
vacy breach when the intermediate results are sent from the
edge device, which means we trust the model modell run-
ning on the edge device. However, the intermediate results
could be intercepted by either network hackers or malicious
providers and fed to another attacker model (modela) that de-
viates from the original user task.
Assumption 1. The privacy breach happens when the inter-
mediate result a is applied to a model that is different from
modelr, deviating from its original task.
Based on Assumption 1, we focus on strategies that pre-
vent applying a to modela that can reveal the privacy other
rather the original user task. The difficulty for privacy protec-
tion is that, after obtaining a, the attacker can apply arbitrary
post-processing in order to breach the privacy. Although re-
covering x through a seems a difficult task, the attacker can
easily extract a lot of useful information through a, which has
already been proved by [Osia et al., 2018].
To further ease the discussion, we also formulate the at-
tacker behavior as shown in Eq. 3. As stated in Assump-
tion 1, after an attacker obtains the intermediate results a, the
attacker model, modela = fa(x; θa) is applied to a for dis-
closing the privacy information (yp).
yp = fa(a; θa) (3)
To counter the attack, privacy protection strategy as shown
in Eq. 4 is applied, which strengthens modell (e.g., adding
noise to a as shown in Eq. 5), in order to reduce the accu-
racy of yp, while deteriorating the accuracy of y as little as
possible, as shown in Eq. 6 and Eq. 7.
f
′
l (·; θ
′
l) = g(fl, θl) (4)
a
′
= f
′
l (x; θ
′
l) (5)
y = fr(a
′
; θr) (6)
yp 6= f ′a(a
′
; θ
′
a),∀f
′
a(·; θ
′
a) (7)
Note that, we use f
′
a and θ
′
a here indicating that the attacker
may changemodela as well as its parameters specially for a
′
.
3.2 Drawbacks of Existing Approach
Currently, there are a few research works such as DPFE [Osia
et al., 2018] and Shredder [Mireshghallah et al., 2019] focus-
ing on protecting user privacy in the scenario of edge-cloud
system running DNN models. However, none of them solves
the privacy protection problem entirely.
For DPFE, its privacy protection relies on the well-defined
sensitive variables, which means it requires the end user to
identify what kind of information they need to protect. How-
ever, in practice, the user may not know the exact privacy
that should be protected and thus fails to provide such in-
formation [Bellekens et al., 2016; Malandrino et al., 2013].
Even if such information is provided, the optimization strat-
egy of DPFE makes it privacy specific, which means one
DPFE model is only able to protect the specified privacy and
has little potential for generalization. The above drawbacks
deteriorate the effectiveness of DPFE, and thus prevent its
widely adoption in practice. Whereas for Shredder, although
the approach of Shredder is not based on specific privacy in-
formation, the metric of Mutual Information (MI) for evalu-
ating the effectiveness of privacy protection targets the entire
database rather than a single image, and thus is insufficient to
measure the privacy protection for a single user.
Specifically, we argue there are two reasons indicating MI
is not a good indicator for evaluating the methods for pri-
vacy protection. Firstly, the calculation for MI can only
represents group privacy rather than pairwise privacy. The
definition of Mutual Information (MI), I(X;Y ) is shown in
Eq. 8, where X,Y are discrete random variables in database
Dn, that is defined on domain D. As illustrated in Shred-
der, the calculation for MI of ith pixel in the image is de-
noted as xi, and thus the MI for the entire image is denoted
as X = [x1 . . . xn] ∼ fX . Similarly for intermediate results,
the MI is denoted as Y = [y1 . . . ym] ∼ fY . Therefore, the
calculation of MI is based on estimating the distribution of
X and Y over the entire dataset (fX and fY ). Such calcula-
tion of MI results in the group privacy rather than pairwise
privacy for a single image [Wang et al., 2014]. It also means
MI is only useful regarding a given test dataset, which fails to
represent our scenario of edge-cloud system where the input
image from the user cannot be predicted in advance, and thus
insufficient to evaluate the effectiveness of privacy protection
methods (demonstrated by our experiments in Sec.4.2). In
our scenario, privacy protection should be enforced at pair-
wise level, targeting a single user.
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x,y∈Dn
pX,Y (x, y) log
pX,Y (x, y)
pX(x)pY (y)
(8)
Secondly, the calculation of MI dose not accurately re-
flect the amount of information. To prove this observation
with experiments, we cut the VGG16 model [Simonyan and
Zisserman, 2014] with BatchNorm layer and the AlexNet
model [Krizhevsky et al., 2012] at each convolutional layer.
After fine-tuning the models on a subset of ML-Image
dataset [Wu et al., 2019], we calculate (based on the calcu-
lation proposed by Shredder) MI between the first channel
of original input and the intermediate result. As shown in
Fig. 2, intermediate results from deeper layers may not lead
to a decrease of MI, on the contrary sometimes increase MI.
Based on the MI changes across different layers, we can con-
clude that information contained at different layers of DNN
models fluctuates. However, deeper layers in a DNN model
are considered to provide more abstract representation of the
data [Shwartz-Ziv and Tishby, 2017]. According to Data Pro-
cessing Inequality [Beaudry and Renner, 2011], information
reduces as the depth of the model grows. Such discrepancy
between the MI results and the above principle indicates that
MI cannot be used to represent the amount of information ac-
curately. Therefore, using MI to evaluate the effectiveness
of privacy protection applied to intermediate result is insuffi-
cient.
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Figure 2: MI between first channel of original input and intermediate
result of after each convolutional layer for VGG16 and AlexNet. The
models are fine-tuned on a subset of ML-Image dataset.
Beyond the evaluation metric, the evaluation of both DPFE
and Shredder targets much harder tasks for the attacker,
which is hardly persuasive for the effectiveness of privacy
protection of their approaches. For example, in DPFE the
attacker task is defined as identity prediction, which is much
harder than the original user task (attributes prediction). Sim-
ilarly for Shredder, the original user task requires identifying
whether the number is greater than 5, however the attacker
task is designed to identify the exact number between 0 and
9, which is again a harder task. In such experiment settings,
reducing the feature dimension of the intermediate results us-
ing the approaches proposed by DPFE and Shredder can de-
teriorate the accuracy for the attacker task, however whether
it is still effective when targeting the attacker task at the same
hardness level of the user task remain unclear. Therefore, the
existing experiments are insufficient to prove the effective-
ness of their methods.
3.3 A New Testimony
In Sec. 3.2 we have analyzed the drawbacks of existing ap-
proaches for privacy protection such as simplified assumption
of no model fine-tuning and insufficient evaluation metric MI.
Therefore, in this paper, we formally establish the scenario
and propose new metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of pri-
vacy protection methods for end user especially on the edge-
cloud system running DNN models. Based on Eq. 4, the goal
is to evaluate the performance of privacy protection. We for-
mulate the scenario for privacy protection as follows.
We define the user task as tasku. Based on Assumption 1,
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙& 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙'𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙(
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Figure 3: Relationship between user and attacker models/tasks, with
targets for each training procedure.
the service provider should only extract information that is
useful to generate the correct result for the user task, but
is prevented from all other information in data a
′
. There-
fore, when designing a privacy protection model g(·), the at-
tacker task, taska, should be comparable to the tasku. And a
corresponding attacker model, modela = fa(a; θa), should
be designed to complete taska very well. After design-
ing the privacy protection model g(·) with regard to tasku,
model
′
l = f
′
l (x; θ
′
l) running on the edge device should be
reused to generate input a
′
for taska. At this time, a joint
model is trained that consists of model
′
l and modela, where
parameters of model
′
l are fixed. The joint model can be ex-
pressed as Eq. 9.
y
′
= fa(f
′
l (x
′
); θ
′
a) (9)
Note that, we use x
′
,y
′
here to show that taska may be
defined on another dataset, and θ
′
a is the only trainable pa-
rameter in the joint model, where f
′
l (·) should be considered
as a completely specified function. Here we propose two
new metrics Private Accuracy (PA) and Privacy Index (PI) as
shown in Eq. 10 and Eq. 11, where AccuracyR refers to ac-
curacy generated by random outputs. Both metrics are within
the range of [0, 1], with higher value indicates better result.
PA can be used to evaluate the accuracy loss, whereas PI can
be used to evaluate the effectiveness of privacy protection.
The relationship between PA and PI, as well as the user and
attacker models/tasks is shown in Fig. 3. When designing a
privacy protection model, there is a special constraint. Al-
though the goal of the method is to generate higher PI , one
should consider taska as unknown. Otherwise, PI becomes
valid for only taska and loses its potential for generality.
PA =
Accuracy
′
u
Accuracyu
(10)
PI =
Accuracya −Accuracy′a
Accuracya −AccuracyR (11)
In general, our proposed formulation and evaluation met-
rics have following advantages:
• Our scenario and assumption is based on the real-world
usage and reveals the significant drawbacks of existing
privacy protection approaches, which requires further re-
search efforts to address them.
• For edge-cloud system, we formulate the problem for
privacy protection when running DNN model on such
system, which generalizes future solutions proposed for
such scenario.
• The new evaluation metrics we proposed can measure
the effectiveness of privacy protection at pairwise level,
targeting each single user, which is more useful than MI
that only works for group privacy.
• Our formulation and evaluation metrics allow the trade-
off between the strength of privacy protection and model
accuracy by adjusting (modela)user to different lev-
els of Accuracya, which enables the privacy protection
methods more flexible in practical usage.
4 Experiments
In this section, we present the experiment results to demon-
strate the privacy is vulnerable in the edge-cloud system run-
ning DNN models, even with the existing privacy protection
approach applied. We choose Shredder [Mireshghallah et al.,
2019] as one of the state-of-the-art methods focusing on pri-
vacy protection for evaluation, which is proved to be insuffi-
cient for protecting privacy of individual user in our proposed
scenario.
In our experiments, we use Open Images from ML-
Image [Wu et al., 2019], a dataset specially designed for
multi-objective detection, for training and testing the user
models. And we use VOC2012 [Everingham et al., ], a pop-
ular dataset for vision task, for fine-tuning and testing the at-
tacker models.
We define the user task, tasku, as a single-objective clas-
sification task on a subset of ML-Image, which contains 11
classes (shop, seabird, generator, bag, seat, needlework, key-
board, trail, basketball player, fungus and salad). Each class
consists of 5,000 images approximately (due to some died
image links from the original dataset), which ends up with
53,165 images in total. We use 48,013 images for training,
and 5,152 images for validation (both image sets have the
same ratio for each class). We define the attacker task taska
as a binary classification task on VOC2012 dataset, identify-
ing whether an image contains human or not. We follow the
official image spilt for training and validation.
All models in our experiments are trained using SGD with
momentum = 0.9, and weight decay = 3×10−5. Besides,
we use a label smooth algorithm [Szegedy et al., 2015] with
 = 0.1 for standard CrossEntropy loss. We change the
learning rate and apply a decay to learning rate according to
different tasks and models for better training results.
4.1 The Effect of Cutting Point Selection
In our scenario described in Sec.3.1, we need to cut an exist-
ing deep model into two parts, with each part running on the
edge device and cloud service respectively. Specifically for a
classification model, the cutting point can be applied at dif-
ferent convolutional layers, where privacy protection method
should be applied at the cutting point, right after the par-
tial model for feature extraction [Mireshghallah et al., 2019;
Osia et al., 2018]. According to [Mireshghallah et al., 2019]
the deeper cutting point is, the better the privacy protection
is. However, such claim is suspicious, because different mod-
els may have different properties, especially considering the
factors such as computation and storage requirements that
could become overwhelming for edge device. The trade-
offs should be evaluated for selecting the cutting point, such
as how the selection affects privacy protection and model
accuracy. Therefore, we conduct several experiments on
AlexNet [Krizhevsky et al., 2012] based on the settings of
Shredder (except the dataset, we use ML-Image instead) to
measure the effect of cutting point selection.
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Figure 4: Performance evaluation of Shredder for different cutting
points on AlexNet with ML-Image dataset. Privacy is measured in
MI. All metrics are normalized.
We evaluate the effect of cutting point selection on the
deep model from four different aspects, including accuracy
and privacy (e.g., MI), computation (e.g., FLOPs) and stor-
age (e.g., number of parameters). For the ease of compar-
ison, we normalize all metrics within the range of [0, 1].
Accuracy is normalized by the original accuracy on ML-
Image using AlexNet (84.12%). MI is normalized based on
MIoriginal−MInoise added
MIoriginal
, which is the higher the better. FLOPs and
Params indicate the ratio of the entire model that is performed
on the edge device, which are the lower the better.
As shown in Fig. 4, because most parameters are in the lin-
ear layer of AlexNet, the choice of cutting point does not af-
fect the parameters too much. However, since the most com-
putations performed at the convolutional layers, cutting point
selection affects the FLOPs significantly. It is seen that if a
deeper cutting point is chosen, then the computation pressure
is shifted to the edge device. In the extreme case (e.g, at conv5
layer), almost all computation are performed at the edge de-
vice. Regarding the accuracy, adding noise after each of the
cutting points does not affect the model accuracy noticeably.
However for MI, there is no clear trend on how the the cutting
point affects MI reduction. Specifically, except conv4 layer,
other selection of cutting point causes a deterioration of pri-
vacy protection, which indicates using Shredder for AlexNet,
neither too shallow nor too deep layers should be chosen as
the cutting points. Such limitation on cutting point selection
narrows down the trade-off between computation on edge de-
vice and strength of privacy protection.
In the following section, we will focus on the cutting points
that achieve strong privacy protection indicated by higher MI
reduction, and demonstrate how existing approach becomes
invalid when applied in our proposed scenario.
4.2 Insufficiency of MI
Given the problem definition in Sec. 4, if MI is sufficient
to represent the effectiveness of privacy protection, we can
say that a model with high MI reduction should generate
less accurate results on taska. To validate that, we use
AlexNet, VGG16 bn [Simonyan and Zisserman, 2014] and
ResNet50 [He et al., 2015] as the base models (for ResNet50,
we make the cutting point at the granularity of Bottlenecks to
keep its integration), and apply Shredder method to obtain
the models that produce intermediate results with decreasing
MI. Then we train the joint model defined in Sec.3.3 to deter-
mine whether MI is sufficient to indicate the effectiveness of
privacy protection.
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Figure 5: MI reduction and accuracy for AlexNet, VGG16 bn and
ResNet50 on VOC2012 for taska. Dot line indicates the best per-
formance each model can reach without any constraint.
As shown in Fig. 5, the noise applied in the model leads
to significant MI decrease compared to the original model.
For the cutting point at conv13 layer of VGG, the MI reduc-
tion even reaches up to 90.54%. The MI results in Fig. 5
indicate that the privacy of the user task is well protected.
However, when the attacker uses another model, modela, in-
stead of modelr and fine-tune the joint model according to
Sec.3.3, the fine-tuned models can generate high accurate re-
sults on taska (slight decrease of accuracy compared to the
Best result across various cutting points of different DNNs).
These results indicate that in our scenario, the privacy protec-
tion method such as adding noise proposed by Shredder fails
to provide privacy protection for the user task. For example,
when applying the noise to the cutting point at conv4 layer
of AlexNet, although it achieves the highest MI reduction
(e.g., 66.48%), the model accuracy on taska only reduces by
3.79% compared to the best accuracy. Therefore, the above
mismatch between MI and model accuracy on taska indicates
that MI is insufficient to measure the effectiveness of privacy
protection for edge-cloud system.
On the contrary, PA and PI proposed in this paper are
better metrics for evaluating the effectiveness of privacy pro-
tection, as shown in Tab. 1. Higher PAmeans better accuracy
Cutting Point PA PI Accuracy on taska (%)
AlexNet-1 0.94 0.03 79.86
AlexNet-2 0.97 0.05 79.10
AlexNet-3 0.95 0.03 79.80
AlexNet-4 0.97 0.12 77.00
AlexNet-5 1.00 0.36 69.64
VGG-11 0.95 0.18 80.79
VGG-12 0.97 0.21 79.57
VGG-13 0.98 0.43 71.45
ResNet*-8 0.97 0.02 92.76
* we use ImageNet pre-trained weights for later proce-
dures.
Table 1: PA and PI are calculated for AlexNet, VGG16 bn and
ResNet50 with different cutting points. (8th layer is the deepest
cutting point where the FLOPs required on edge device are smaller
than on cloud for ResNet50.)
for the user task, whereas higher PI means lower accuracy
for the attacker task and thus better protection for privacy.
Different from MI, PI can accurately reflect the accuracy of
taska, with higher PI indicating better privacy protection.
For example, in Tab. 1, PI indicates conv5, conv13 and conv8
can achieve the best privacy protection among all the cutting
points for AlexNet, VGG16 bn and ResNet50 respectively,
which is consistent with the least accuracy of taska. There-
fore, PI is a better metric for evaluating the effectiveness of
privacy protection methods for edge-cloud system.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we formulate the privacy protection problem
for DNN models running on edge-cloud system, revisit the
assumption for privacy breach and advocate two new metrics
for evaluating the effectiveness of privacy protection meth-
ods. We investigate the existing approaches with experiments
to demonstrate their drawbacks in the determining the cutting
point for privacy protection, as well as show the consistency
of our new metrics in measuring the accuracy of user task and
the level of privacy protection.
This paper serves as the position paper that calls for re-
search efforts on privacy protection for DNN models running
on edge-cloud system. We highlight several take-aways as
follows to encourage future research efforts on this specific
research direction.
Take-away 1: Dynamic noise regarding each input im-
age is required to protect intermediate results. Adding
noise has been proved effective to restrict the information
contained in intermediate results. However, existing meth-
ods are designed without awareness of inputs. The noise used
in such methods fails to consider the specific features of in-
put image, which also limits their usage of privacy protection
for a single user, or pairwise privacy. Therefore, using in-
put feature to generate noise can be one potential direction to
achieve pairwise privacy.
Take-away 2: The noise can be added at multiple cut-
ting points simultaneously. Currently, existing approaches
only consider adding the noise at a single cutting point of the
DNN models. Since the noise will not generate too much
computation cost on the edge device, adding noise at multi-
ple cutting points can be another promising solution to further
restrict the information that can be extracted from the inter-
mediate results by the attacker.
Take-away 3: New optimization functions should be de-
signed regarding the new evaluation metrics. In this paper,
we propose new evaluation metrics PA and PI . However,
there are no optimization functions currently available for
them. Especially for PI , the optimization function should
also consider the constraints described in Sec. 3.3. Therefore,
new optimization functions should be designed regarding PA
and PI in order to achieve effective privacy protection.
We hope this paper can shed the light in the research direc-
tion of privacy protection for DNN models running on edge-
cloud system. We wish the discussion highlights can pave the
road for future research and encourage more researchers to
work in this field.
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